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Cholera is popularly remembered as the disease which made the nineteenth century its
own, appearing from obscurity to devastate Europe repeatedly in the years between 1830
and the 1920s. Six pandemics spread fear and alarm, terrible illness and horrible death,
across the Continent before 1900,1 distorting the true demographic significance of the
disease and deflecting both contemporary and historical attention from the indigenous
"diseases ofsociety".2 Epidemic cholera had its origins in India; for Europe it was only an
invader, as plague had been originally. In its status as invader, and in the magnitude of its
geographical range, lay its impact and its influence on nineteenth-century society.
More than thirty years ago, AsaBriggs drew attention to the international significanceof
cholera, and stressed the need for comparative examination of responses to cholera in
different countries and in different epidemics.3 Although the disease has since attracted
much historical attention, this has been largely concentrated on individual epidemics
(notably that of 1830-32), and on contemporary debates about the causes ofthe disease.4
It is only recently that studies which recognize and stimulate consideration of the wider
European cholera experience ofthe period 1830-1900 have begun to appear, and the later
history of the disease in Europe remains largely unexplored.5 Both the pattern of local
responses tothelateroutbreaks, andtheprocesses involvedincholera'sgradual withdrawal
from the Continent, merit investigation, as does the wider context of the development of
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public health programmes in the different European countries. Although this paperfocuses
on the English experience of cholera after 1850, and on the development by the English
health authorities ofa system forexcluding the disease from the country, this local history
has a more than local significance.6 As apublic health problem, cholera was recognized to
be of international dimensions by 1850, and, in the search for a coherent international
preventive policy inthedecadesafter 1850, thecholeraexperienceofEnglandwas to prove
crucial.
The lastEnglish choleraepidemic occurred in 1866, afterwhich England was singularly
successful inexcluding the disease. Thetraditional European response to invading infections
was quarantine: cholera and the English example between them ended that tradition.
Quarantines were a marked feature of government responses to the first and second
pandemics; yet they transparently failed to prevent outbreaks of cholera, and were often
abandoned.7 It was this failure that stimulated the first attempts to achieve an international
policyforlimiting thedisease. Thefirst International Sanitary Conference was convened at
Paris in 1851 to examine Europe's position in respect ofcholera, and to try to establish an
international consensus on enforcing broadly uniform precautionary measures.8 It was the
first of a series of such conferences, most of which foundered on the issue of trade,
quarantine and international shipping. The majority of European countries continued to
favourquarantine asthe meansofpreventing theentry ofsea-bornecholera, butBritain was
adamantly opposed to any restriction on the freedom of trade. While medical men and
diplomats struggled to reach agreement at repeated international conferences-at
Constantinople in 1865,Viennain 1874, Rome in 1885-the Englishpreventive authorities
evolved and perfected a system of sanitary surveillance coupled with detailed preventive
measures (isolation and disinfection), which appeared to meet the challenge of imported
cholera effectively. The British success in avoiding epidemic cholera after 1870, together
with increasing familiarity with the causes and movements ofthe disease, were influential
in changing attitudes among European observers. At the Conference ofVenice (1892) and
Dresden (1893), the value of the English system was finally acknowledged, and its
techniques adopted as the basis of international preventive action.9
Britain's position as an island nation extensively involved in international trade was a
crucial determinant in the development of her cholera exclusion policy. Politically and
economically committed tofreedomoftrade, the country had todevise measuresotherthan
quarantine for the exclusion of imported infectious disease.'0 The absence of epidemic
cholera from the country in the decades after 1870 has often been attributed to sanitary
6 This account ofpreventive approach tocholera as an invader complements and extends my discussion ofthe
preventive authorities' contribution to controlling the indigenous infectious diseases: Anne Hardy, The epidemic
streets: infectious disease and the rise ofpreventive medicine, 1856-1900, Oxford University Press, in press.
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9 Hauser, op. cit., note I above, pp. 534-8.
"' ForBritishquarantine see CharlesF.Mullett, 'AcenturyofEnglishquarantine, 1709-1825',Bull. Hist.Med.,
1949, 23: 527-45; J. C. McDonald, 'The history of quarantine in Britain during the 19th century', Bull. Hist.
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improvement;" indeed, MichaelDureyhasconvincingly arguedthatthe "ideal"conditions
for the spread of cholera within the community had begun to disappear soon after the
outbreak of 1847-48.12 While there is no doubt that improving sanitary conditions and
watersupplies made alargecontribution toEngland'sfreedomfromcholera, thenumberof
imported cases after 1870, andthe persistence ofwaterborne typhoid in various partsofthe
country into the 1890s, indicate that possibilities for the epidemic extension of cholera
continued to exist. Closer examination of the circumstances of the European cholera
visitations after 1866, and ofthe development ofEnglish sanitary legislation, suggests that
good fortune and an alert public health organization played a significant part in Britain's
virtual freedom from cholera.
CHOLERA OBSERVED
The mid-Victorian public health organization was empirical in its methods, and
observation ofthebroadepidemiological behaviourofcholera,asrevealedby itspatternsof
dissemination across Europe, wascentral tothedevelopmentofEngland'sdefencesagainst
the disease. Already by the 1850s, the European manifestations of cholera were being
studiedwithinterestbyEnglish sanitarians tryingtopredictthelikelyassaultsofthedisease
on their own country. The pandemics of 1830, 1846 and 1853 suggested that it moved
outwardfromitshomelandby successive steps,followingoverlandtraderoutes andlinesof
communication.'3 It wouldonly reach Englandin the secondyearofa European visitation,
although minor outbreaks generally occurred in the autumn of the first year, heralding a
majorepidemic inthefollowingsummer. Theprincipal dangerforEnglandlayinthearrival
of the disease at the Baltic ports, especially Hamburg: in 1832, 1848, and 1854, the
epidemic outbreak of cholera at Hamburg was rapidly followed by the appearance of the
disease in seaports on the east coast of England.'4
Season was also important in timing the arrival of epidemic cholera; August and
September were the months ofmostdanger inEngland.'5 The cholera vibrio isnotoriously
sensitive toheat andhumidity. Itcan survivefordaysorevenweeks inmoistlinen, butonly
for a few hours when exposed in hot dry conditions. It can also live in water for variable
lengthsoftime depending on thepHfactor, salinity anddegreeofcontamination withother
conditions. In nineteenth-century Europe, the long-term pattern, and local and seasonal
distribution ofthe disease were partly determined by climatic variation,16andthis seasonal
factor was in some degree recognized by contemporaries. By the mid-I850s, public health
observers, tracing the movement of the disease across Europe, were able to view its
approach with a certain dispassion. Until it reached the Baltic, there was little to fear; ifit
reached Hamburg in the late autumn, as it often did, there would be no major English
outbreak until thefollowing summer, whenconditions foritsresurgence andonward march
were once again favourable.
" For example, Anthony Wohl, Endangered lives: public health in Victorian Britain, London, Edward
Arnold, 1983, p. 124. F. B. Smith, Thepeople's health 1830 to 1910, London, Croom Helm, 1979, p. 233, draws
attention to the part played by "strict national quarantine".
' Durey, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 204.
13 Hauser, op. cit., note I above, p. 533.
'1 Lancet, 1857, ii: 374.
"Ibid., 1894, ii: 444.
16 Topley and Wilson, op. cit., note I above, pp. 449, 451.
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Growing familiarity with the behaviour of cholera bred little immediate complacency,
however. More than any other decade, the 1850s were haunted by the disease. The
epidemic of 1853-4, following so close upon the heels of that of 1848-9, awoke fears that
the disease might become indigenous, or at least that the intervals between epidemics
would shorten still further.'7 The presence of cholera in the Crimea, at a time when
newspaper correspondents were revealing the horrors of the Crimean War to the British
people, helped to keep it in the public eye. When the disease arrived at the Baltic ports and
Hamburg in October 1857, the General Board of Health issued detailed preventive advice;
a small outbreak at West Ham was widely regarded as a warning to expect a major
epidemic in 1858.18 The Lancet fulminated against the state of the Serpentine, and urged
preventive action: "There are six clear months before us for sanitary improvements-six
months for organising a thoroughly efficient staff of officers, and for pre-arranging a
concerted method of action".19
Yet there is little evidence from the reports of London's newly appointed medical
officers ofhealth ofany specifically cholera-induced sense ofurgency in their work, while
the reports of the new Medical Department of the Privy Council focus on smallpox and
diphtheria in these years. Perhaps it was as well that the expected epidemic did not
materialize in 1858. Possibly because ofthe great heat and drought ofthat summer-it was
the year of the Great Stink in London-cholera retreated from the southern Baltic
seaboard, to ravage instead Stockholm and St Petersburg.20 In 1859, however, it returned
to Hamburg, and an English epidemic was confidently expected: cholera, remarked the
Lancet, "now seems to become a periodical scourge to this country"'.21 A number ofcases
were introduced into London and Tyneside from Hamburg,22 but, again perhaps because
of adverse weather conditions, there was no extension of the disease.
Throughout this anxious decade, the prevailing preventive attitude towards cholera was
determined by pragmatism.23 Nothing certain was known of the immediate or
circumstantial cause of the disease; the waterborne theory of cholera transmission
received wide publicity, but little wholehearted acceptance. Debate about the true cause of
cholera continued, with some espousing miasma theory, some water theory, and many a
middle position, which took account of both. The reactions of the medical community to
the threat ofepidemic cholera in the autumn of 1857 reflected this diversity ofopinion.24
There were, however, signs of a new confidence in dealing with cholera among the
medical community. This was based not on any improved understanding ofthe etiology of
the disease, but rather on past experience and on improved sanitary organization. Despite
7 Lancet, 1858, i: 72.
8 Ibid., 1857, ii: 374-5, 369, 478.
'9 Ibid., 367, 369, 478.
2() Ibid., 1858, ii: 41, 363, 660. For the Great Stink see Carleton B. Chapman, 'The year of the Great Stink',
Pharos, July 1972, pp. 90-103.
21 Ibid., 1859, ii: 137.
22 Ibid., 137-8, 169, 226.
21 Pelling, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 310, argues that the "main product ofmid-nineteenth-century epidemiology
was a kind of compromise .. an intelligent position consistent with interest, experience and methodology." I
endorse this view. See also Christopher Hamlin, 'Predisposing causes and public health in early nineteenth-
century medical thought', Soc. Hist. Med., 1992, 5: 43-70.
24 Lancet, 1857, ii: 374.
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the little evidence of cholera-specific sanitary activity, the Lancet, for example, exhibited
considerable faith in the efficacy ofLondon's newly appointed medical officers ofhealth:
At last a vigorous and vigilant administration has been organised in the Boards and
Officers of Health, called into action by the Metropolis Local Management Act, for
protecting the population of London against future assaults [of cholera]. That our
defensive provisions in the capital are immeasurably superior to those of any former
period cannot be doubted.25
This judgment was undoubtedly based on the prescription of general sanitary
improvement: urging the importance ofpreparation for the expected major outbreak ofthe
disease in 1858, thejournal's emphasis was firmly on sanitary improvement, efficient staff
and a pre-determined course of action.26 Local activity, local improvement, were still seen
as the key to successful prevention.
THE LESSONS OF 1866
By contrast with the 1850s, the explosion ofpandemic cholera in the 1860s was met by
an established sanitary organization, with nearly ten years of work behind it. In those
years, considerable improvements had been effected in both the environment and public
health organization of London and other large cities: in 1864, the Registrar-General
thought the great towns in a far better condition than ever before to encounter cholera.27
Against this background, the English sanitary authorities viewed the movement ofcholera
across the continents of Asia and Europe from the 1860s with increased confidence; a
confidence founded on the basis ofaccumulated evidence, andexperience, ofcholera as an
associate of insanitary conditions.
Cholera, however, retained the ability to surprise. In 1865, for the first time, it chose to
approach Europe not by the recognized land route, but by sea. The disease broke out in
Egypt in June 1865, and this, together with an unusual prevalence of diarrhoea in London,
aroused considerable alarm in England.28 By mid-July the "epidemic tension" was high,
and quarantine measures were being debated.29 While the government resolutely stated its
opposition to quarantine, the alertness of the Medical Department and the General-
Register Office to foreign epidemics produced a positive response to the threat of cholera
in 1866. John Simon traced the movement of the disease across the European continent
throughout 1865.30 Reporting the outbreak of cholera at Rotterdam on 21 April 1866, the
2' Lancet, 1857, ii: 367.
26 Ibid., 369, 396.
27 Annual report oftheRegistrar-General (henceforth RGAR), Parliamentary Papers (henceforth PP) 1867 xvii,
p. 49.
2X Briggs, op. cit., note 3 above, p. 87, states that cholera entered Britain from Egypt in 1866. This is not strictly
true, although the case is also made by Ernest Hart, 'Cholera and our protection against it', Nineteenth Century,
1892, 188: 638. There is no suggestion in John Netten Radcliffe's report that the two cases which might have
infected the river Lea originated in Egypt; the first case was employed in a local brush manufactory, and it is
possible that imported raw materials were contaminated. Radcliffe's findings clearly indicate that cholera was
coming into Britain from many of the major Channel and Baltic ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg, for
example) throughout May, June and July, and Radcliffe himself evidently considered the European connection to
be the important one: Medical Officer's annual report to the Privy Council later to the Local Government Board,
(henceforth MOARPCLGB) 1867 xxxii, Appendix 7f, pp. 265-7.
29 Lancet, 1865, ii: 99-100.
31 MOAR to PC, PP 1867 xxxvii, Appendix 7, pp. 264-5.
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Lancet gave thanks for the "enlightened measures" ofthe Medical Department ofthe Privy
Council, through which, "we may anticipate greater success in warding off this terrible
enemy ... owing to the extension of sanitary improvements".3' In the event, the 1866
epidemic proved the cholera defences of the nation, and of London in particular, to be
deficient in two vital respects: the cleanliness of water supply and the regulation of
shipping.32 The medical authorities' experience of the 1866 cholera epidemic was
important in several respects. It established the formula for dealing with local cholera
outbreaks; a formula which was to be reissued at every cholera scare until the end of the
century. It confirmed to many the significance ofthe quantity and quality ofwater supply,
and resulted in the eventual extension of constant supplies throughout London. Imported
simultaneously with the cattle plague which devastated British herds in the summer of
1866, cholera pointed to the role ofthe country's ports in admitting communicable disease
into the country. And finally, the 1866 epidemic increased the confidence of the medical
community in their own ability, through sanitary improvement and rigorous sanitary
supervision, to limit outbreaks ofthe disease where it was not transmitted through water. It
was, however, the attention paid to quality ofwater supplies and the regulation ofshipping
in the years after 1866 that led to the country's virtual freedom from cholera in the last
three decades of the century.
Doubts and difficulties continued, however, to surround issues of water purity before
the twentieth century.33 This meant that the first element in the country's defences against
cholera was her shoreline, the point of entry for the disease. Uncertain of the exact
relationship between water and the transmission of cholera, and also of the exact
efficiency of existing methods of water purification, English resistance to cholera after
1870 concentrated on safeguarding against the importation of cases. In this respect, the
experience of 1866 was critical: it resulted in the refocusing of the English preventive
effort. Cholera was no longer viewed as a local problem, but as one which must be met by
a broadly based preventive scheme which took account of its status as invader, and of its
means of international transmission.
PORT SANITARY AUTHORITIES
The cardinal importance of preventing the entry of dangerous communicable diseases
into the country was recognized by the creation of a whole new division to the country's
preventive organization, the Port Sanitary Authorities. For commercial and political
reasons, the introduction of quarantine for shipping was out of the question.34 The
experience of 1866, however, convinced the medical community that some form ofcontrol
on the entry ofvessels from areas known to be affected by communicable diseases was an
"' Lancet, 1866, i: 464.
32 Forthe history ofthe 1866 outbreak in London see Luckin, 'The final catastrophe', op. cit., note 4 above, pp.
32-42; idem, Pollution and control: a social history ofthe Thames, Bristol, Adam Hilger, 1986, chapter 7.
33 Forprogress and problems with water supplies see Durey, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 204; Anne Hardy, 'Water
and the search for public health in London in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries', Med. Hist., 1984, 28:
250-82, p. 273; idem, 'Parish pump to private pipes: London's water supply in the nineteenth century', Living
and dying in London, Med. Hist., Supplement no. I 1, London, WIHM, 1991, pp. 76-93; Christopher Hamlin, A
science ofimpurity: water analysis in nineteenth-centurvy Britain, Bristol, Adam Hilger, 1990; A. C. Houston,
Studies in water supply, London, Macmillan, 1913, chapter 7.
34 See Mullett, op. cit., note 10 above, pp. 527-45; McDonald, op. cit., note 10 above, pp. 22-44.
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essential preventive measure. Already in 1858, the Epidemiological Society had been
unanimous that medical inspection should be introduced for steamers and other vessels
trading between Britain and other countries, particularly during the prevalence of
epidemics.35 The importations of 1866 served to re-emphasize the lesson: as John Simon
observed emphatically, "contagions current on the Continent of Europe must be deemed
virtually current in England".36 Some attempt was made in the Sanitary Act 1866 to
provide for the "shipping difficulty",37 but when cholera became epidemic in Eastern
Europe in 1871, and there were serious fears of its importation, the Medical Department
took action. The authorities ofthe 48 leading ports were prepared for preventive action by
the Department's inspectors with such success that a system of local port defence was
given statutory confirmation in the following year.38
The establishment ofthe Port Sanitary Authorities in 1872 finalized the structure ofthe
British preventive organization. The system offered both protection against the import of
communicable disease and the regulation ofsanitary conditions within ports. In the Port of
London, the sanitary regulation of shipping was finally put on a regular footing, having
been virtually absent in the past. Some accommodation for sick seamen had long been
provided by the Seamen's Hospital Society,39 and during the cholera epidemic of 1866
this organization proved invaluable, not only in providing hospital facilities for seamen
and coastal traders, but also in undertaking a ship-to-ship visitation.40 The sanitary
conditions revealed by this inspection were notencouraging. The problem lay not so much
in the ocean and coastal traffic ofthe port as in its regular residents. As the Lancet phrased
it, no class was so totally unprotected by "even the ghost of a sanitary regulation".4'
Between London Bridge and Blackwall hundreds of barges lay moored in tiers three or
four deep, without either sanitary facilities or water supplies. The barges themselves
provided only a couple of tiny cabins, in which whole families dwelt, and were
ill-ventilated, poorly lit and insanitary; nearly all the cholera cases dealt with on the
Belleisle hospital ship in 1866 came from this quarter.42
A leading part in the campaign for the greater regulation of shipping was played by
Henry Letheby, Medical Officer of Health for the City of London. Letheby had for some
time been concerned about sanitary conditions in the Port,43 and the shipping provisions of
the 1866 Sanitary Act stimulated him to arrange the appointment of a special officer to
inspect shipping within the City's jurisdiction, on the north side of the Thames between
the Temple and the Tower. The City was the only London authority to take such a
" Lancet, 1858, i: 72.
-36 MOARPC, PP 1866 xxxiii, p. 43.
37 SanitaryAct 1866,29& 30Vict.c.90, secs. 29,30. Nuisanceauthorities, withPrivyCouncilpermission, were
allowed to regulate for the removal to hospital and maintenance there for as long as necessary any persons
suffering from dangerous or infectious disorders brought into their districts by any ship or boat.
3x Royston Lambert, SirJohn Simon, 1816-1904, and English social administration, Bristol, McGibbon and
Kee, 1963, pp. 435-6; Public Health Act 1872, 75 & 76 Vict. c. 79, sec. 20. See also Lancet, 1871, ii: 227, 326.
3' The Seamen's Hospital Society was responsible for the Dreadnought Hospital, Greenwich, established in
1763. The Hospital was taken over by the NHS in 1948, and was closed in 1988. In 1866 the Society borrowed
the Belleisle from the Government as a floating hospital ship for cholera cases.
40 Lancet, 1866, i: 527; ibid., 1871, ii: 326.
4' Ibid., 1866, ii: 130.
42 Ibid.
43 Lancet, 1871, ii: 326. See also Letheby's annual reports, and his 'Report on the Sanitary Inspection of
Shipping', 1868.
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measure, although the medical officers ofboth the Dreadnought Hospital and the Customs
were by now convinced of the need for action-uniform action-along the whole course
of the river, especially in respect of the sanitary condition of shipping and the import of
infectious disease." The section ofthe Port supervised by the City's inspector represented
only a tiny fraction of the total problem, and when cholera threatened in 1871, the Privy
Council Medical Department organized a supervisory authority which representedjointly
the various sanitary authorities which abutted on the Thames.45 In practice, the
arrangement did not prove fully satisfactory, as most of the authorities were reluctant to
finance the necessary measures.46 It was perhaps for this reason that under the Public
Health Act, 1872, the City was constituted the sole sanitary authority of the Port of
London, with all expenses of the port sanitary authority to be paid for from corporate
funds.47
The first Medical Officer for the Port of London was Harry Leach, whose first
appointment had been as assistant physician at the Dreadnought Hospital, and who had
had charge of the Belleisle and organized the sanitary inspection of shipping during the
cholera crisis of 1866. A young man of tact and good temper, boundless energy and
undaunted courage in the face ofdifficulties, Leach took up his duties in July 1873.48 The
task which he faced was formidable. London was then "the wealthiest, most populous, and
worst arranged port in the world".49 The Port of London sanitary district extended from
Teddington Lock to the North Foreland, was 88 miles long, and included 8 sets of docks
and 13 creeks. It was surrounded by 46 waterside authorities, each of which had had
riparian powers in the Port before 1872, but which now had no sanitary powers below the
Trinity High Water mark within the limits of the Port. Six other bodies were more
particularly concerned in the general business of the Port: the Customs; the Marine
Department of the Board ofTrade; Trinity House; the Thames Conservancy; the Thames
contingent of the Metropolitan Police; and the dock companies. It was estimated that
25,000 vessels entered and left the Port yearly, while there were 2,300 sailing and 4,000
"dumb" barges on the Thames, the latter alone containing a population ofabout 15,000.50
Compared with the sanitary supervision of even a populous London parish, the sanitary
management of the Port of London was no light task.
Although sanitary conditions within the ports were a subject of daily concern, the
greatest vigilance ofthe English port sanitary authorities was directed towards the import
ofcommunicable and infectious disease. Disease prevention policy in the first ten years of
the port authorities' existence was to a large extent exploratory and experimental, but the
powers which the port authorities exercised in cases of communicable disease were
4' Henry Letheby, 'Report on the sanitary condition of shipping', 1868, pp. 6, 9.
45 Lancet, 1871, ii: 326, 343, 413, 448.
46 For Letheby's complaints see MOAR, City of London, 1870-1, p. 50; Lancet, 1871, ii: 645.
47 Public Health Act, 1872, sec. 20.
4' Leach died in harness, of tuberculosis in November 1879. He was succeeded by another strong and genial
personality, William Collingridge, who served the City Corporation fortwenty years as Port Medical Officer, and
a further twelve as MOH for the City.
4' Lancet, 1871, ii: 270.
5 Halfyearly report ofthe Medical Officer (henceforth MOHYR), Port of London, December 1873, p. 4;
Lancet, 1871, ii: 270, 326.
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already greater in several respects than those of their mainland colleagues. Under the
Quarantine Act, 1825, all infectious disease on board vessels entering port, with the
important exception of coasters, was to be reported to the Customs, who detained such
vessels until theirrelease was recommended by the officerofthe local sanitary authority.5'
The Public Health Act, 1875, made possible the compulsory removal to hospital ofevery
patient suffering from an infectious disease on shipboard, and enabled the port sanitary
authorities, with the approval ofthe Local Government Board, to make regulations for the
compulsory notification and isolation of infectious cases. With respect to disinfection,
ships and vessels in harbour were subject to thejurisdiction ofthe sanitary authority, in the
way that houses were in mainland sanitary districts.
Within a decade or so, however, it became apparent that ships' captains and crews were
evading the regulations, because they resented the interference with their business and
their liberty which sanitary regulation represented: a more precise definition of the port
authorities' powers was clearly required. In 1885, therefore, the Public Health (Shipping)
Act explicitly extended the powers granted to mainland local authorities in 1875 in respect
of infectious disease to the port authorities. These provisions enabled port MOHs to
cleanse and disinfect where they considered it necessary to check the spread ofinfectious
disease; to destroy infected bedding, etc.; and to remove those without proper lodging or
accommodation who were suffering from dangerous infectious disease to hospital. Port
sanitary authorities could make regulations for the removal to hospital of infected persons
brought in by ships; and might impose a penalty for the exposure of infected persons and
articles, and for the letting of lodgings in houses where infectious disease existed. They
were empowered to provide hospitals; to recover the cost of hospital maintenance from
patients; and to provide a gratuitous temporary supply of medicine and medical attendance
for poor persons in their districts.52
The sphere of the port sanitary authorities' interest extended widely beyond their own
port limits, and contributed significantly to the overall success of the system. Apart from
such indications of foreign epidemics as were obtainable from the Registrar-General's
reports,53 careful attention was paid to the disease condition of ports of contact both at
home and abroad. While something may be gleaned of the extent of such monitoring from
various sources, Henry Armstrong, the very able Medical Officer of Health for Tyneside,
left a description of the activities of his department which probably reflects the practices
current in the great ports in the latter decades of the century. On Tyneside, extensive use
was made ofthe available printed sources of information. The medical and daily press, the
Shipping Gazette, and otherjournals were examined daily for reports of disease abroad. A
list of vessels bound for the Tyne from infected ports was kept, in which were entered the
name of the ship, the date of her passing different ports on her voyage, and the expected
date ofher arrival. Ships on this register were visited without delay by sanitary officers on
arrival. The sanitary officers routinely interrogated the captains of all vessels boarded for
5 Quarantine Act 1825 (6 George IV c. 78), secs. ix, xiv, xvi.
52 Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), secs. 110, 120-1, 124-6, 128, 130, 131-3. Public Health
(Shipping) Act 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 35).
5' TheGeneral RegisterOffice kept awary eye on foreign epidemics and regularly published statistics relating to
international disease incidence.
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information of infectious disease in their port oforigin.54 It was this type of information-
seeking, systematic monitoring and determined sifting of individual reports that
constituted the country's most effective barrier against the import and dissemination of
dangerous infectious diseases in the years after 1885.
Early experience proved the need for such diligence. In his first six months as port
MOH, Harry Leach discovered "pretty exactly" the quarters from which cholera might be
expected. Leach quickly became aware that London was being made a port ofcall for large
emigrant ships carrying parties of between 100 and 300 persons, which were hauled into
dock and remained two or three nights in the port. These vessels and their freight often
came from continental ports infected, or suspected of infection, with cholera. In July, for
example, the steamship Iris carrying Danish and Swedish emigrants brought two
unsuspected cholera cases to London.55 Once the emigrants were settled in their emigrant
lodging houses in Whitechapel (lodging houses with this especial function were to be
found in Whitechapel, the City and St George-in-the-East) a serious outbreak occurred (28
cases among 82 persons, with 8 deaths), and measures had to be taken to prevent the
spread of the disease in the East End.56 Throughout 1873, cholera was more or less
prevalent in many parts of Europe, notably in Paris, Le Havre, Rotterdam and Antwerp,
and during the autumn isolated cases were introduced into London, Liverpool and
Southampton from Hamburg, Rotterdam, Caen and Le Havre. In most cases the disease
did not appear until the vessel had reached, or nearly reached, port. Leach's reaction was
to request all ship's brokers to furnish him with early notice of the arrival of emigrant
ships. In every case the MOH boarded such ships between Southend and Gravesend, and
systematically examined both passengers and crew, thus, he observed, not complicating
commercial interests by detaining the ship.57
Even in 1873, Leach was plainly worried by the public health consequences oftrade and
technological progress. The opening of the Suez Canal and the extension of the world
railway system yearly increased European contact with the East, where cholera was
endemic. In Leach's view, cholera was fastbecoming endemic on the European continent,
and London's "almost hourly communication" with the Baltic and Mediterranean ports
placed it in considerable danger.58 The Medical Department of the Local Government
Board was equally worried: George Buchanan, Simon's successor, saw the behaviour of
cholera in Europe in the years 1865-74 as "of very evil omen", and instructed Netten
Radcliffe, the Department's cholera expert, to examine the behaviour of the disease in
Europe in these years.59 Leach had, however, already taken practical action. In 1874, he
made a European tour, visiting Le Havre, Antwerp and Rotterdam, as likely to provide fair
54 H. E. Armstrong, Port sanitarv administration on the Tvne, 1888, p. 1. Armstrong's description of his
procedure in suspicious cases is quoted verbatim in Anne Hardy, 'Smallpox in London: factors in the decline of
the disease in the nineteenth century', Med. Hist., 1983, 27: 111-38, p. 129.
ss MOHYR, Port of London, December 1873, pp. 11-12. See also PP 1874 xxxi, p. 6, fn.
56 MOARLGB, PP 1874xxxi, p. 5. See alsoMOARLGB, PP 1875 xl, Appendix 1: 'The diffusion ofcholera and
its prevalence in Europe', by J. Netten Radcliffe.
7 MOHYR, Port of London, December 1873, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 21.
9 MOARLGB, PP 1875 xl, pp. 145, 153-368. British attitudes toforeigners-"wogs begin at Calais"-perhaps
reinforced this preventive suspicion of Europe as the source of cholera. For such attitudes see Colin Holmes,
John Bull's island: immigration andBritish society 1871-1971, London, Macmillan Education, 1988, pp. 56-84,
294-302.
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examples of the disease procedures of France, Holland and Belgium. His findings were
revealing. In the French ports, the "utmost secrecy and mystery" prevailed concerning the
existence of cholera, so that it was almost impossible to obtain an exact date, or to form
correct conclusions. In the Belgian ports early news ofepidemic cholera was not difficult
to obtain, because all medical men were compelled to inform the secretaries ofthe sanitary
commissions of any occurrence of the disease. It was not considered advisable, however,
to publish exact bills of mortality until the epidemic had ceased. In Holland, everything
was apparently open. All physicians were under heavy penalty to inform the burgomasters
of every case of cholera. The latter advertised the facts in the dailyjournals, informed the
sanitary commissions, and quarantined affected houses by directing that a distinguishing
card be placed in the windows.60 Not surprisingly, Leach concluded that news of cholera
cases in Belgium and Holland was probably sufficiently reliable for preventive purposes;
while shipping from France should always be treated with caution.
In spite of the efforts of very capable MOHs such as Leach and Armstrong in the major
ports, the procedures for the detection of imported disease on incoming ships continued
unsatisfactory until the Shipping Act, 1885. In 1882, following representations from the
United States that smallpox had been imported by immigrant shipping, the Medical
Department ordered an inquiry into the sanitary aspects of emigration and immigration,
appointing F. E. Blaxall, a former naval man, to the task.6' Blaxall's report indicated an
increasing solicitude among the organizers ofemigration for the health and comfort of the
emigrants, and concluded that the quantity ofpreventable sickness spreading among such
people was relatively small. His report on the English port arrangements for detecting
infectious disease among arrivals from abroad was not so satisfactory. He pointed to a lack
ofany organized relation between the shipping companies and the sanitary authorities, and
was particularly anxious for the regular medical inspection of foreigners landing in
English ports. His suggestions for the improvement of sanitary practices in the ports and
on shipboard, which chiefly concemed medical inspection of passengers and crews, were
based on his own experience of what was practicable in naval terms.62 Blaxall's inquiry
certainly demonstrated the desirability of some form of medical control on what was now
a very considerable emigrant traffic: between 1820 and 1881, the number of emigrants
passing through British ports had increased tenfold, from 123,528 in the quinquennium
1815-20 to 1,347,827 in 1876-81.63
The cholera scare of 1883-4 compounded anxieties about port preventive organization.
Cholera broke out in the Egyptian port of Damietta in June 1883, and although the
epidemic was overby September, the thousands of British troops stationed in Egypt led to
grave fears ofits importation.64 Netten Radcliffe had retired from the Medical Department
because of ill health in 1882, and George Buchanan was conscious that the Department's
cholera expertise had been seriously diminished. The regular official monitoring of the
progress and fluctuation of the disease in other countries had not been maintained, and
6() MOHYR, Port of London, June 1874, p. 62.
61 MOARLGB, PP 1883 xxviii, p. 635, Appendix 14.
62 Ibid., p. 636. Blaxall hadbeen medical officer aboard HMSCaledonia when theshipexperienced an outbreak
ofcholera in June 1850. This was dealt with by medical inspection, isolation and treatment. Apparently similar
practices on other vessels suggest that this was a standard formula. Ibid., p. 789.
63 Ibid., p. 783.
64 MOARLGB, PP 1884-5 xxxiii, p. 12.
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Buchanan felt unable to assess the likelihood of epidemic cholera spreading through
Europe from Egypt.65 Fresh prevention orders were issued to the port sanitary authorities,
and a memorandum on cholera precautions distributed to other local authorities. The
importofrags from Egypt was forbidden forthe duration ofthe epidemic there, although it
was not known whether cholera had ever been imported in rags.66 These measures were
repeated in 1884, when epidemic cholera spread through France (causing between seven
and eight thousand deaths), Italy and Spain, and were supplemented by a hasty inspection
ofthe arrangements of42 majorport and riparian sanitary authorities. These were found to
be on the whole satisfactory,67 but the legislation of the following year did much to
regularize practices in the various different authorities, establishing a common ground of
sanitary powers between port, riparian and mainland public health authorities.
Britain was fortunate in her cholera experiences in both 1872 and 1884. In the former
year, John Simon recorded a handful of introductions: three at London, two at Liverpool,
one at Southampton, and "at least one" at Swansea. Ofthese, the most serious was the Iris
incident in London: Simon noted the danger to London as being "extremely great".68 In
1884 Buchanan hadonly three importations to report: a troopship arriving at Portsea; and a
steamship from Marseilles and an Italian mail steamer at Cardiff.69 In London, Leach's
successor William Collingridge "scrupulously maintained" emergency precautions in
1883 and 1884. All vessels arriving regularly direct from Marseilles received special
attention;70 and arrangements were made for the medical inspection of every vessel
entering the river, in the event of any serious spread ofthe disease making such a course
advisable.7' There can be little doubt of the efficiency of Collingridge's arrangements:
they were described as "excellent" by Shirley Murphy, the highly critical MOH of the
LCC.72
FREEDOM FROM CHOLERA AFTER 1867: PREVENTION AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
The failure of cholera to challenge English defences seriously in these years, as in
1857-9, lay only partly in the English preventive system. It was probably important that
no sustained epidemic wave ofthe disease reached Europe, and it was certainly significant
that it did not reach the Baltic ports. The challenge of imported cholera during the 1880s,
as shown by the importations into the Port of London, was never very great (Table 1).
The 1890s were, however, a very different matter. Between 1892 and 1897, 118 cases
were brought into the Port of London, of which 58 were introduced in 1895 (Table 1).73
The final great European pandemic ofcholera began in the spring of 1892. Two centres of
infection were soon identified: Paris, where the disease broke out in April 1892, and
65Ibid., pp. 12-13.
66 Ibid., p. 12, Appendix A, nos. 14 b, 14 c. The memorandum on precautions against the spread ofcholera, as
Buchanan admitted (p. 205), was almost verbatim that issued by Simon in 1866 and 1871.
67 Ibid.
68MOARLGB, PP 1874 xxxi, pp. 6-7.
69MOARLGB, PP 1884-5 xxxiii, p. 204.
70 These were the Peninsula and Oriental, Messageries Maritimes, and Trieste boats.
71 Lancet, 1884, ii: 1 19.
72 MOAR, London County Council, 1892, p. 26.
7 Inthis yearcholeracases were introduced from BuenosAires, StPetersburg, and Kronstadt: MOHYR, Port of
London, June 1895, pp. 12-13; ii, p. 12.
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Table 1: CHOLERA CASES IMPORTED INTO LONDON, 1884-1901
Year Cases Year Cases
1884 - 1893 15
1885 - 1894 10
1886 - 1895 58
1887 7 1896 4
1888 2 1897 12
1889 - 1898 1
1890 - 1899 -
1891 - 1900 1
1892 19 1901 -
(Source: Annual Reports ofthe Medical Officerfor the Port ofLondon.)
Russia. From these two centres the disease spread swiftly out across Europe.74 The worst
outbreak was at Hamburg, where between mid-August and mid-November 16,956 cases
were recorded, with 8,605 deaths.75 Even before the Hamburg epidemic, the English
authorities were on the alert. On 18 June, the Local Government Board medical officer,
Richard Thorne Thorne, issued a memorandum in which he noted that on five ofthe seven
occasions on which cholera had visited Britain, it had travelled by the Russian
route-across Russia to the Baltic ports, and from there commonly extending to the North
Sea and British Channel ports. It was from here that the disease had "several times"
reached England, notably from Hamburg.76 In 1892 also, this linkage proved very clear:
cholera broke out at Hamburg on 16 August; the first imported case was recorded in
England on 25 August.77 Between 25 August and 18 October, 35 cases of cholera were
imported, but none extended beyond arrivals at the ports involved.78
The warning of 1892 did not go unheeded. When the scale ofthe 1892 epidemic became
clear, the Medical Department conducted a hasty survey of the condition of the port and
riparian sanitary authorities. The unsatisfactory arrangements which were found in many
ports, and the continued prevalence of the disease abroad, prompted a more extensive
survey in 1893. Known in the Department as the "CholeraSurvey",79 this was published as
the PortandRiparian SanitarySurvey, 1895.80 Although when this survey was begun only
one third of the 60 ports had a satisfactory and efficient sanitary administration,8' the
arrangements for the medical inspection of vessels and persons-the crucial factor in
cholera prevention-was found satisfactory in all but five.82 In certain districts, however,
7 MOARLGB, PP 1894 xxxix, pp. xvii-xxii. Cholerahadspread toRussiafrom BritishIndia, viaAfghanistan,
Persia and Turkestan in 1892-3.
" Ibid. The anatomy ofthis epidemic has been marvellously laid bare in all its aspects by Evans in Death, op.
cit., note 3 above.
76 MOARLGB, PP 1894 xl, Appendix A, no. 16.
77 Ibid., p. 8.
7X Ibid.
79Ibid., p. 391.
xo Port and riparian sanitary survey, PP 1895 lii.
xl This was defined as including a competent and adequately remunerated MOH; sanitary inspectors; an
infectious disease hospital; disinfection facilities; adoption ofthe Infectious Diseases Notification Act 1889 and
ofsection 125 ofthe Public Health Act 1875. In a third ofother ports the administration was "lax and inefficient",
the remainderfalling in between. The lax ports were: Beaumaris, Boston, Chepstow (which had noforeign trade),
Cowes, Dartmouth and Totnes, Falmouth and Truro, Harwich, Hayle, Ispwich, King's Lynn, Milford,
Portsmouth, Preston, River Blyth, Sandwich, Scilly Isles, Wells and Yarmouth.
82 Port and riparian sanitarv survey, PP 1895 lii, pp. vi, viii.
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notably London, River Tyne, Hull and Goole, Southampton, Weymouth, Plymouth,
Bristol, Cardiff, Bury-and-Cadoxton, Swansea and Liverpool, the medical inspection
arrangements were not only highly satisfactory, but were carried out by the MOHs with
such devotion to duty, that the Inspectors concluded they must have "largely contributed
to the marked success with which imported cholera was controlled at nearly all English
ports during 1892 and 1893".83 In 1893, cholera appeared in 62 localities, of which 15
were metropolitan sanitary districts. There were 287 cases and 135 deaths; but in 42
districts only single cases were known. These included 14 ofthe metropolitan districts. In
only one metropolitan district was there more than 3 cases, and in only five districts
overall was there a loss of more than 10 persons.84
Britain's freedom from epidemic cholera after 1866 had produced in many quarters the
confident belief that such epidemics were a thing of the past.85 Although the Medical
Department and local sanitary officers exercised extra vigilance and diligence in
precautionary arrangements during each fresh European crisis,86 England's limited
experience of cholera between 1867 and 1892 encouraged public complacency. During
these years, generations grew up who had no personal experience of cholera epidemics,
yet were aware ofthe disease as a constant threat abroad. As a result, the 1890s witnessed
a marked discrepancy of emphasis between preventive action and public reaction to the
threat of a cholera invasion.
The difference in public response to cholera between 1866 and 1892 reflects the growth
ofconfidence in the sanitary service, as well as a wider public interest in sanitary matters.
There was a far greater response in anticipation ofcholera in 1892 than there had been in
1866. In 1866, cholera was no longer a novelty; its coming was beginning to be seen as a
cyclical event; and in that year also the previous eruption of rinderpest-the cattle plague
whose progress across Europe had been scrupulously followed by the Medical
Department-absorbed public attention and distracted anxieties about cholera.87 At this
time, too, the Medical Department was privileged in its sources of information and in its
interest in European sanitary matters. Before the major outbreak ofcholera in England in
early July, the progress ofthe disease abroad had only been sparsely reported in the public
press.88 English interest in cholera in 1866 was essentially insular in character. The
intellectual effects of advancing technology are very evident in the contrasting cholera
reportage of 1866 and 1892-3: the development of the telephone and the telegraph, the
extension of railway networks in Europe, and the emergence of passenger steamship
fleets, had revolutionized journalistic perspectives. By 1892, The Times, for example,
carried lengthy and detailed reports from its special correspondents on cholera in Hamburg
and Russia, while notices of the progress of the disease in distant parts of the world
studded its pages. Readers of The Times would have been hard pressed to maintain an
ignorance of European cholera and the threat to England in 1892.
1-3 Ibid.
84 Thedistrictsconcerned wereGrimsby(127deaths),Hull (17),Ashbourne, Derbyshire(15),Cleethorpes (I1),
and Clacton, Essex (I 1).
8' Lancet, 1871, ii: 645; MOAR, Camberwell, 1883-4, 'Memorandum on cholera', p. 203.
86SeeMOARLGB, PP 1884-5 xxxiii, pp. 12-14; Appendix A, nos. 14(b), 14(c); MOAR,Camberwell, 1883-4,
'Memorandum on cholera', p. 203; MOAR, Strand, 1883-4, Appendix, pp. li-lxxii; ibid., 1884-5, pp. 15-20.
87 Norman Longmate, Kingcholera. Thebiographvofadisease, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1966,pp.212-13.
88 The Times, for example, carried only a bare handful of such references between April and July 1866.
263Anne Hardy
Journalistic interest in the prospect ofcholera in 1892 seems to have generated a greater
public awareness of that prospect than in 1866, among the educated classes at least. Nor
can it be doubted that the activities of the preventive authorities contributed to this
awareness: already in the summer of 1892, they were taking "infinite pains" to make their
work efficient.89 Yet the zeal ofthe sanitary authorities in this respect may also have been
counter-productive. Although there was no indication of any "epidemic tension" or panic
over the threat ofcholera,90 there were those who considered that this might be the result
of the sanitary authorities' energetic reaction. On 5 September 1892, The Times carried a
letter which sought to remind the general public that "the greatest ally ofcholera is fear".
The writer pointed to the differences in scale between epidemic cholera in the East-a
death-rate of 559 per 10,000 at Damietta in 1883-and in England: death-rates of 30, 11
and 7 per 200,000 in the "epidemics" of 1849, 1854 and 1866. He thought it not
unreasonable to assume that ifcholera reached England that year, mortality would be less
than in 1866, and recommended going about one's own business, "in the ordinary way":
This I venture, with some experience to say is a safer course than being frightened into
exceptional precautions, preventives, and remedies.9'
Nonetheless, cholera provoked an extensive reaction in 1892. The Times leader of 5
September, while applauding the "foresight, zeal and activity" of the sanitary authorities,
elaborated the argument by pointing out that sanitary offenders were a relatively small
proportion ofthe community. In a passage remarkable for its unscientific logic, the paper
urged the authorities to temper zeal with discretion, to take pains to do good, but only by
stealth.
The class ... likely to grow nervous underthe steady showerofwarnings and exhortations
now being poured out upon them is considerable, and the importance of the fact is
manifest when it is remembered that fear ... is the most potent ally of epidemic cholera
... Provident fear in their [the authorities'] breasts may be the motherofsafety, but should
it spread to those under their charge it can only sap the spirit of the garrison and make
things easy for the enemy.92
Behind these remonstrations may be detected a whole spectrum of social and economic
fears; no longer that cholera itself should damage the established order and prosperity of
the country, but that the anticipation of cholera should do so.
It was evidently a potent anxiety. By the following spring when the sanitarians were
fully expecting a major outbreak of the disease, Arthur Shadwell, The Times
correspondent in Germany and Russia the previous year, complained irritably of the
attitude of the press, which was encouraging the widespread popular belief that cholera
was always more or less present on the Continent, and that the outbreaks at Hamburg and
9 The Timnes, 3 September 1892.
90 Ernest Hart, 'Cholera and our protection against it', Nineteenth Century, 1892, 188: 650; Metropolitan
AsYlums Board annual report (henceforth MABAR), 1893, p. 264.
" The Times, 5 September 1892. For the preventive riposte to this letter see Hart, op. cit., note 90 above.
92 The Times, 5 September 1892. The paper went on tonotethat "sensational statements" hadbeenmade, which
received "a certain degree of support from the fussy action of local authorities here and there".
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Paris presented no greater danger than those successfully encountered on many previous
occasions, "with the laudable but superfluous intention of allaying an alarm which does
notexist".93 Twenty-seven years ofimmunity from epidemic cholera had done their work:
for most Englishmen, it seems, its continued existence on the Continent was a further
illustration, if need be, of superior English standards of hygiene, and generally greater
degree of civilization.
For informed sanitarians, however, the public optimism of 1892 was misplaced; with
cholera at Hamburg, the danger to England must be considered grave. Arguments in
favour ofquarantine were again,rehearsed.94 The Medical Department deployed Dr Barry
to monitor the diffusion of cholera through Europe, and by the late summer of 1892 was
issuing precautionary advice.95 New measures were taken to control the passage of
emigrants from the Baltic, and a Cholera Order was issued on 6 September.96 Meanwhile,
theLancet, manifesting almost hysterical alarm, lauded the new controls on the passage of
emigrant Russian Jews, and urged extensive attention to preventive measures.97 The
Metropolitan Asylums Board hastily appointed Arthur Shadwell to supervise emergency
arrangements in case of an epidemic in London, while the city's local authorities and
medical officers rehearsed their cholera provisions and prepared stocks of posters.98
Similarly extensive precautionary arrangements had been made in 1884,)9 but Shadwell
considered in retrospect that the country had never been exposed to such danger from
cholera since 1866.1°°
It is plain that neither in 1884 nor in 1892-3 were the preventive authorities taking any
risks. In both these pandemics elaborate arrangements were made to deal with any
outbreak of cholera in London, and the preparations in London in 1892, in particular,
highlighted the similarities and contrasts in the approach ofprofessionals and public to the
prospects of a cholera epidemic. There was no panic, but whereas the public health
authorities took the epidemic threat seriously, and prepared accordingly, public attention
was not seriously engaged. Indeed, a whole chaotic, preventively anarchistic spectrum of
popular preoccupations and beliefs was ranged against the professional cohesion of the
preventive services. While the newspapers were anxiously peddling the calming view that
the country was in no real danger ofcholera, very real fears were evidently entertained by
some sectors of the population.'0' These were fuelled by the reported handful of cases,
9' MABAR, 1893, part vi, p. 264.
94 See Thorne Thorne's explicit rejection ofquarantine, MOARLGB, PP 1894 xxxiv, pp. xxiv-xxix. British
practice at this date involved the examination of vessels on entry to the port, and removal to hospital of sick
passengers and crew. Ships in port were then inspected daily for the duration of the incubation period of the
disease as recognized at the time, i.e., for up to 15 days.
9" MOARLGB, PP 1894xxxixc 7412,PartIII,pp. xvii-xxx; Appendix 12: 'Report by DrBarryontheorigin and
progress ofthe western diffusion ofcholera during the year 1892'; MOARLGB, PP 1894 xl, Appendices 14-20.
9' MOARLGB, PP 1894 xxxix, Appendix no. 16.
7 Lancet, 1892, ii: 591.
"x Newington Vestrv minutes, 21 September 1892; MOAR, St Giles, 1892, pp. 74-9; MOAR, Mile End Old
Town 1892, pp. 11-12; MOAR, Plumstead, 1892-3, p. 99; Camberwell Vestrv anniual report, 1892-3, p. 245;
1893-4, pp. 252-3.
' E.g. MOAR, St George-in-the-East 1884, p. 43.
"x'MABAR, 1893, part vi, p. 264. See also Lancet, 1893, ii: 1071.
"" See, for example, Newington Vestry annual report, 1893-4, p. 30.
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notably by the death of a cleaner at the House of Commons from undoubted Asiatic
cholera in September 1893.102 On the other hand, Arthur Shadwell reported sourly on the
lack of public co-operation encountered in his attempts to establish the metropolitan
cholera service: "In this respect our enlightened British democracy has shown no more
intelligence than the benighted peasantry of Russia".'03
British shortsightedness and obstinacy manifested itselfespecially over the siting ofthe
ambulance stations. In part, this was perhaps a reflection of the general attitude towards
infectious disease hospitals ("not in my back yard"), but Shadwell, who took an educated
interest in popular politics, hinted at deeper reasons. He eventually managed a fairly
satisfactory provision of ambulance stations throughout the city, except in Rotherhithe.
Here only two stations could be arranged, the Workhouse Infirmary and the Metropolitan
Asylums Board's own South Wharf. Both Shadwell and the Medical Officer of Health,
Josephus Shaw, made repeated attempts to obtain more, since they considered Rotherhithe
a prime cholera target, and it was a district of many suitable yards and other places. The
owners of these premises were, however, resolute in declining permission for their use,
on the ground that the presence of a cholera litter would be seized by the labour
agitators ... as a pretext for causing trouble among the working men.'04
It is a notable feature ofthe list of cholera stations that less than a dozen of the 133 appear
to have been privately owned establishments, rather than local government, Poor Law,
Police or hospital premises.'05
Britain was in many respects fortunate to escape cholera in 1892-3. Vigilant and
well-prepared sanitary authorities might nonetheless have been hard-pressed by any
concerted assault of the disease. Symptomless carriers of cholera were a factor which no
preventive action could hope to counter on any significant scale, while the dangers
associated with the freedom of travel through the Channel passenger ports was well
recognized.'06The outbreak at Grimsby and Cleethorpes in August 1893, in which 127
people died, and from where cases were traced to twenty-six towns in the Midlands and
the North, from Gloucester and Hereford in the west to Newcastle-upon-Tyne, gave clear
warning of the consequences of inefficient sanitary supervision and poor sanitary
circumstances.'07 The serious prevalence of typhoid in the valley of the Tees meanwhile
"02 For this case see MOARLGB, PP 1894 xl c. 7539, Appendix no. 6, pp. 123-4: 'Report by Dr Deane
Sweeting on a fatal case of cholera in Westminster'; ibid., Appendix 7, pp. 125-6: 'Memorandum as to advice
given with regard to the disinfection of certain portions of the House of Commons' by Dr S. Monckton
Copeman. According to Shadwell, attempts were made to hush up or garble the truth of this event: MABAR,
1893, part vi, p. 267.
1'-3 MABAR, 1893, part vi, p. 264.
"'' Ibid., p. 261-2.
" Ibid., part vi, 'Report on the Board's cholera arrangements', Appendices A and B.
I>6 Dr Yunge-Bateman, 'Cholera from a passenger port point of view', Public Health, 1892-3, 5: 261-2;
aincet, 1893, i: 424.
1"7 For this outbreak see MOARLGB, PP 1894 xl, Appendix no. 2, pp. 47-88: 'Report on cholera in 1893 in
Grimsby and Cleethorpes', by Dr Reece. Preventive anxieties were particularly sharp on this occasion because
Grimsby fish were sold throughout the country, while Cleethorpes was already a thriving pleasure resort. The
Grimsby cockle beds were known to lie beside the local sewer outfall: Lancet, 1893, ii: 636.
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illustrated that the diffusion of cholera by water was still a possibility.'08 Once again,
however, seasonal and geographical factors seem to have been significant in preventing
disaster.
The most serious epidemic ofcholera in Europe in 1892 was that at Hamburg; and from
Hamburg, as experience showed, lay the greatest danger to England. Detailed examination
of the circumstances of 1892 suggest the narrowness of England's escape. The Hamburg
epidemic broke out on August 16, rushing to a climax in the last fortnight of August and
the first week of September, and thereafter declining until it disappeared at the end of
October. '09 The timing ofthe epidemic outbreak at Hamburg was of critical significance
in determining whether ornotcholera would issue a major challenge to England across the
North Sea; and in 1892, cholera arrived in Hamburg too late. By 25 August, when the first
imported case from Hamburg was recorded, the year was already past the season at which
cholera most readily found foothold in the country."0 The possibilities of a major
epidemic escalation were small by the time the disease reached London in early
September. Secondly, the European ports most seriously affected by cholera, such as
Hamburg and Antwerp, were distant enough that infected persons could be expected to be
showing typical symptoms of cholera on arrival, and early recognition of the disease by
the port sanitary medical staff was much easier. ''
Despite the alarm caused by Hamburg, the greatest possiblity of danger, as far as the
English preventive authorities were concerned, was not in 1892, but in the following year,
since cholera in the past had generally reached England in the second year ofits European
visitations."2 In 1893, however, the disease made no appearance in Hamburg before
mid-September,"3 although it was active during the spring and summer in the Low
Countries, France and elsewhere in Germany. The first imported cases arrived on
Tyneside from Nantes as early as 25 June; the infection at Grimsby, which had begun in
early August, was traced to Antwerp.'4 Once again, these ports were at a sufficient
distance to facilitate the detection ofcases, except, as the case of Grimsby proved, where
the city and port sanitary authorities were inexcusably negligent. The outbreak atGrimsby,
and its minor consequences, are evidence of the effectiveness of the wider sanitary
organization, forthere was no diffusion ofthe disease in the twenty-six towns to which the
infection was carried from Grimsby and Cleethorpes. It may be, nonetheless, that England
was once again protected from a more severe onslaught ofcholera by the climatic factor.
The summer of 1893 was one ofthose dry, hot summers that characterized the 1890s, and
which was probably inimical to the prolonged survival and disseminative properties of
cholera. As Arthur Shadwell pointed out, the wide geographical spread of cholera in
Europe during 1893 was accompanied by a comparatively low mortality, and although
increased knowledge and improved sanitary conditions might have had some part to play
1' Lancet, 1893, ii: 1071, 1144, 1198. For the Tees Valley problem see PP 1893-4 xlii c 7054, pp. 261-528,
'Supplement in continuation of the report of the Medical Officer for 1891'; 'Enteric fever in the Tees Valley',
Lancet, 1893, ii: 1198.
"' Evans, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 293, Fig. 9.
""1MOARLGB, PP 1894 xl, p. vii; Lancet, 1893, ii: 445.
"' Ibid.
112 Public Health, 1892-3, 5: 12.
113 Evans, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 490.
"4 Lancet, 1893, ii: 445; MABAR, 1893, part vi, pp. 266-7.
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in this, it was hard not to think that the exceptionally dry season had more to do with it.1 15
In England, for example, the greatest diffusion of the disease, and nearly all the cases,
occurred north of a line from the Wash to the Severn, in that part of the country least
affected by the drought.' 16
The incursions of 1893 represented the last extension of cholera into the English
mainland. In 1894 the disease was severely epidemic in Russia, and Germany, Belgium,
Holland, Hungary and Turkey were also affected. In France, however, cholera was on the
retreat, and by 1895 it was waning in Russia, and had retreated still further from Western
Europe, into Galicia, Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. It was not without its old pandemic
powers, however, for when in February 1896 Russia was finally declared free ofcholera, a
severe visitation was beginning to make itselffelt in Egypt.'17 Past experience had by now
so reinforced the confidence of the British public health authorities in their preventive
system and in the modified danger which cholera in the Near East presented, that the
Egyptian outbreak raised little concern. By 1898, cholera had disappeared from the list of
the Medical Department's current anxieties, to be replaced by bubonic plague."18
If the larger movements of cholera were to some extent determined by the vagaries of
season and climate, there is no doubt that sanitary circumstances and personal habits of
cleanliness were major elements assisting its spread and influencing the locality of
epidemic outbreaks. Recognition of these two sets of factors, within the constraint of a
national maritime policy of freedom of trade, and in association with an internal
preventive policy of detailed isolation for infectious disease, formed the basis of the
English defence against cholera in the last three decades of the nineteenth century.
Through the medium of the International Sanitary Conferences, and later of the
International Conferences on Hygiene and Demography, the premises of English policy
were given wide publicity on the European Continent, and came to be generally accepted
with respect to the limitation ofcholera dissemination by shipping in the last years of the
century.' 9 Britain's sanitary surveillance of international shipping comprised the final
plank in a national preventive system which was widely admired by contemporaries-it
was, the Finn Alfred Palmberg noted, the most complete and precise in the civilized
world- and Britain's success at excluding cholera after 1866, like her falling death-rates
from tuberculosis, was regarded as proof of the superiority of that system.'20
While circumstances and good fortune certainly played their part in preserving England
from epidemic cholera in the last three decades ofthe century, the systematic development
ofher sanitary defences, and the policies ofa forward-looking central medical department
supported by a dedicated local preventive network, appear to have been critical in holding
repeated cholera attacks at bay. The calm with which the general public faced the greatest
MABAR, 1893, part vi, p. 269. l6 Ibid.
17 MOARLGB, PP 1896 xxxvii, p. 316; MOARLGB, PP 1897 xxxvii, p. 21; MOARLGB, PP 1898 xl, p. 18.
"8 MOARLGB, PP 1899 xxxviii, pp. 30-8; ibid., Appendix A, no. 18: Dr Bruce Low 'On the diffusion of
bubonic plague', pp. 257-318.
'9 Hauser, op. cit., note I above, p. 538.
21 Alfred Palmberg, A treatise onpublic health and itsapplications in different European countries, London,
Swan Sonnenschein, 1893, p. 3, cited in Anne Hardy, 'Public health and the expert: the London medical officers
of health 1860-1919', in R. M. MacLeod (ed.), Government and expertise: specialists, administrators and
professionials, Cambridge University Press, 1988. See also the speech by Pierre Brouardel published in Public
Health, 1899-1900, 13: pp. 797-8.
268Cholera, quarantine and the English preventive system
of these apparent threats in 1892-3 was partly the result of improved domestic sanitary
conditions, but was also based on confidence bred of past experience, on an improved
understanding of the means by which the disease was transmitted and on broad popular
ignorance ofits epidemiological behaviour. It was those who remembered the epidemic of
1866 who were aware of the dangers of indifference, and who knew, as did Ernest Hart,
that epidemic cholera was a disease which "struck down masses of the population in
limited localities", that still feared its import in 1892.121 Ifthe mystery ofcholera had been
exploded by the end of the nineteenth century, familiarity with its causes and conditions
did not enable the preventive establishment to view its entry into the country with
equanimity.
121 Hart, op. cit., note 90 above, p. 65 1.
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